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This paper analyses the effect of public expenditures in the context of a modified Solow 
model of capital accumulation with optimising agents. The model identifies optimal 
government size and optimal composition of public expenditures which maximize the rate of 
growth in the dynamics to the steady state and maximize the long run level of per capita 
income. Different allocations of public resources lead to different growth rates in the 
transitional dynamics depending on their elasticity. However effects from fiscal policy are 
only temporary and disappear in the steady state. Finally we argue that neglecting the non-
linear nature of the relationship between government spending and growth may lead empirical 
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1    INTRODUCTION  
 
In their seminal contribution, Arrow and Kurz (1969) develop a 
neoclassical model of growth where aggregate production benefits from 
public capital services and government finances public capital by levying a 
proportional income tax, subtracting resources from private agents (see also 
Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998; Bajo-Rubio, 2000). This twofold influence 
implies a non-monotonic relationship between government size and growth. 
Given the properties of diminishing returns to private and public capital, the 
impact of government policy is limited to the transition path to the steady 
state to which the economy converges in the long run. 
The property of convergence, implicit in neoclassical models of growth, 
is an appealing feature in the light of empirical analysis of growth. 
Convergence has, in fact, been shown to have considerable explanatory 
power (Temple, 1999). 
Endogenous growth theories in the late Eighties caused a surge of interest 
in models of growth with fiscal policy. The first contribution in this area is 
the work of Barro (1990) who developed a model where government plays 
an active role in influencing long run growth (see also Futagami et al, 1993). 
All government spending is implicitly productive, it complements private 
inputs and it is included in the production function. The model determines 
the optimal level of public spending, using a non-monotonic relationship 
between government size and growth. Given the absence of diminishing 
returns to capital, endogenous models allow government to permanently 
influence economic growth (Romer, 1994). 
Lee (1992), Devarajan et al (1996) expand on Barro’s model, allowing 
different kinds of government expenditures to have different impacts on 
growth. By employing the traditional distinction between productive and 
non-productive spending (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997; Kneller et al, 
1999), they are able to determine the optimal composition of different kinds 
of expenditures, based on their relative elasticities. Following a similar line, 
Chen (2006) investigates the optimal composition of public spending and its 
relationship to economic growth. He established the optimal productive 
public service share of the total government budget and the optimal public 
consumption share, determined by policy and structural parameters. 
In this paper we analyze the effect of fiscal policy, in the context of a 
modified Solow model of capital accumulation with optimising agents. 
Fiscal policy aims to create different kinds of public capital through 
accumulation financed through a proportional income tax. The model 
developed here determines the government size and the mix of government 
expenditures which maximize the rate of growth and the long run level of 
per capita income. We build the analysis within a neoclassical framework, 
which is still a central organizing framework for empirical research on 
economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  
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The model focus on transitional dynamics to the steady state. There is, 
indeed, an empirical consensus on the fact that the process of convergence 
towards the steady state may take many years to play itself out (Temple, 
1999). This works makes a contribution in this direction.  
We find a non monotonic relationship between growth and government 
expenditures when government size and composition of public expenditures 
are both optimised. Such a relationship disappears during the process of 
convergence. This differentiates our model from those of endogenous 
growth, in which policies affect growth permanently such as those of 
Devarajan et al (1996) and, more recently, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008). In 
these similar results for government size and public spending composition 
are obtained. 
Our model differs from that of Bajo-Rubio (2000) and Carboni and 
Medda (2007), since we introduce representative agents utility maximization 
by a benevolent government (Ramsey rule) and we relax the assumption of 
exogeneity of private savings ratio. In addition, and unlike Bajo-Rubio 
(2000), our model considers the role of the composition of public spending 
in the accumulation process. 
According to Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) we consider all government 
spending as a stock (public capital) but, differently from these authors, we 
divide public capital into two components which may have different 
productivities. Hence, the government can influence growth by deciding the 
extent of its intervention and/or by deciding on the allocation of its resources 
in the two different components of public capital. 
An other important conclusion of this paper is that neglecting the 
characteristics of non-monotonicity of public spending and the different 
impact different types of government have on growth results in mis-specified 
models which bias traditional empirical analysis (Slemrod, 1995).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the core model. Section 3 analyses the dynamics of the fiscal policies and the 
implications of the model. Conclusions are presented in section 4. 
 
2    THE MODEL 
 
In this section we model the effects of fiscal policy on growth as a part of 
the aggregate economy, using an augmented neoclassical framework. We 
explicitly include the public sector in the production function as a distinct 
input based on the rationale that government services are not a substitute for 
private factors, and resources cannot be easily transferred from one sector to 
another. Public capital provide flows of rival, non-excludable public 
services, which would not be provided by the market. Flows are proportional 
to the relative stocks and enter the production function together with private 
capital, labour, and exogenous labour-augmenting technological change. 
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We follow Arrow and Kurz (1969) by considering all government 
spending as an accumulation process designed to create productive public 
capital. It has been demonstrated (Rodrik et al, 2004) that even expenditures 
on maintenance of law and order, health, education, social security, 
distribution of wealth and public administration influence growth. This 
happens through the creation and improvement of institutions, which can be 
considered as a type of public capital (Glaeser et al., 2004). Government can 
also influence growth through investments in other types of public capital 
such as roads and highways, telecommunication systems, R&D capital stock, 
other infrastructures (Aschauer, 1989; Kneller et al, 1999). The different 
impact of each type of government capital on productivity makes it all the 
more necessary to disaggregate the public budget into its various 
components. 
 
2.1    Aggregate production and public capital 
Production of output Y is specified in a Cobb-Douglas form and 
represents a special case of that in Arrow and Kurtz (1969):  
? ? 2121 211 ?????? GGP KKLEKY ????  (1) 
where KP is private capital stock, L is total employment, E is labour-
augmenting Harrod-neutral technology and KG is public-sector or 
government capital. Elasticities are bounded between 0 and 1. Positive but 
diminishing returns to single inputs and constant returns to scale are 
assumed. Unlike Arrow and Kurz (1969) and Bajo-Rubio (2000) we 
consider two categories of public capital ( 21, GG KK ) both of which are 
characterised by elasticities which depend to their productivity (??, ??).  
Following the main literature, we assume a permanent balanced 
government budget and rule out debt-financing of government spending 
(Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). Public spending is financed by levying an 
average flat-rate tax on income ? (0<?<1):    
21 GGGY ????  (2) 
GG ??1 ;   ? ?GG ??? 12  (3) 
where G1 are traditional core productive expenditures, G2 are all others 
productive government expenditures and ? (0???1) is the share of G1 on 
total spending.  
Public capital accumulation depends on total government revenues. 
Assuming equal depreciation rates ?  for different kinds of public capital, 
accumulation dynamics are defined by: 
    
 4
11 GG KGK ?? ??? ;     ? ? 22 1 GG KGK ?? ????  (4) 
and from eq. (2) we get:    
? ? YKKKK GGGG ?? ???? 2121 ??  (5) 
where dots indicate time derivatives. If government sets ?=1, then only 
accumulation of public capital of type 1 will be financed. For ?=0, the 
government sets G1=0 and net growth of public capital will involve only 
capital of type 2.  
Equations 2-4 also show that, for a given ?, if government wants to raise 
investment in public capital it is necessary to augment the tax rate ?. The 
economy will benefit from increased public capital but it must support a 
greater fiscal burden, which subtracts resources from private firms. As long 
as public capital productivity is equal to private capital productivity, changes 
in fiscal policy will have neutral effects on overall production. By contrast, a 
trade-off between private and public capital productivity occurs and, given 
their different productivity, the effects of an expansion (reduction) in 
government spending will depend on the composition of expenditure.  
 
2.2    Capital accumulation and dynamics 
 
The accumulation of public capital builds on two conflicting aspects of 
government spending (G). One is a detrimental effect, taxes which reduces 
private resources, and the other is a positive one, investment in public capital 
(Aschauer, 1989).  
The rationale for a non-monotonic relationship is fairly simple: the 
growth rate increases with G up to a maximum level and then starts 
diminishing. One important target of public spending is to ameliorate growth 
performance by improving the marginal productivity of the private sector’s 
physical capital and labour. This is generally attained by providing social 
and economic infrastructures, since these help private investment and 
promotes growth. Assuming private maximizing behaviour, the marginal 
product of capital receives beneficial effects from additional services. At the 
same time taxes have a detrimental effect, as they make individuals worse 
off. The optimal level of government infrastructure occurs when the 
marginal product of public infrastructure equals marginal social costs. Any 
public infrastructure beyond this level crowds out private investment, 
reduces the level of output and has a frictional effect on growth. 
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Private capital accumulation depends positively on the private saving   
(Y-C), and negatively on the average tax rate. For simplicity we assume a 
depreciation ratio ? equal to that of public capital1:   
? ? PP KCYK ?? ???? 1)(?  (6) 
We assume a representative consumer-producer agent who maximizes a 
constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution utility function over an 











1  (7) 
where c represents per capita consumption, ????is the constant rate of time 
preference, and ?>0 is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution. The inclusion of agents' utility optimization, and the relaxation 
of exogeneity of private saving ratio assumption, differentiate this work from 
that of Bajo-Rubio (2000). Here our goal is to find fiscal policies which 
maximizes a representative agent's lifetime utilities. 
Expressing accumulation equations (4) and (6) and production function in 
terms of (technology-augmented) labour input we have: 
? ?? ? PP mkcyk ???? ?1?  (8) 
11 GG mkyk ?? ???  (9) 
? ? 22 1 GG mkyk ??? ???  (10) 
where xnm ????  and lower case letters indicate variables divided by 
(LE), n is the labour growth rate and x the labour-augmenting technological 
progress. 




GGP kkky ?  (11) 
The maximization of utility is subject to costate variable equations (8)–














                                                 
1 Ai and Cassou (1995) develop a model with different ?s. In their empirical investigation they estimate a 
lower depreciation rate for public capital. 
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where ?s denote costate variables (Lagrange multipliers).  
From the first order condition on the Hamiltonian and differentiating with 














c  (14) 
2.3    Steady state equilibrium 
Growth of public and private capital is bounded by the diminishing 
returns. We can then derive expressions for kP, kG1 and kG2 in the steady 
state, as a result of the system of six differential equations given the 
production function (11):  
? ?0;0;0;0;0;0 2121 ?????? ?? ?????? ckkk GGP  (15) 















??? ????  (15.c) 
Imposing eq.(9) and (10) equal to zero we obtain: 
??









mkkk GGp ??    (15.e) 
substituting (15.d) into (15.a) and imposing  :0?1??
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m  (15.f) 
substituting (15.e) into (15.b) and imposing   
? ?


































































?  (15.h) 
Dividing (15.g) and (15.h) by ?3 and solving the dynamic optimization 










































































































? mkG  (18) 
?? ??
where stars denote steady state values and 













P and Q are parameters deriving from algebraic transformation:2  
212211 22 ?????????? 22222
1)( ??
mmmmmmm ????????














mmQ ????  (21) 
Substituting (16)-(18) into (11) gives the long-run steady state output per 
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 (22) 

































                                                
 
(23) 
The steady state level of output is related to exogenous and endogenous 
factors, as well as to the elasticities in the production function. Exogenous 
factors are the rate of depreciation of capital inputs, the rate of population 
growth and technological progress which are implicit in m (all negatively 
related). 
Endogenous factors are the public policy instruments: 1) the size of the 
government, expressed as the ratio of total government spending over total 
output, ?, and, 2) the allocation of the public budget to the accumulation of 
KG1 and KG2 expressed by ? and (1-????respectively. 
Public policy instruments have ambiguous effects on the steady state 
level of output per worker. The term ? in equation (23) represents a positive 
impact of the share of government size on steady state output, since a 
fraction ? of output is devoted to the creation of productive public capital. 
This latter positively influences total output at elasticity equal to ?1??2. By 
contrast the term (1-?) represents a detrimental aspect of government 
spending, since only a fraction 1?? of total output (i.e. the private agent’s 
disposable income) remains to influence production at elasticity ?.  
Equation (23) supplies another interesting piece of information. Given the 
size of government, the composition of public spending plays a significant 
role in determining the level of output per worker. The level of output per 
 
2 The complete algebra is not reported here for reasons of space. It is however available upon request. 
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unit of labour and the share of government spending used for investment in 
public capital of type 1 (or type 2), captured by the parameter ? (or 1-? ) are 
linked by a non-monotonic relationship. As long as ?1??2, an allocation of 
resources in favour of public capital with higher elasticity will raise the 
steady state level of output per worker. However this process of shifting 
public resources cannot be continued indefinitely due to the diminishing 
returns on public capital. It is worth highlighting that Devarajan et al (1996) 
obtained a similar result but within an endogenous framework.  
 
3    FISCAL POLICY AND TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS 
 
The aim of the government in a decentralised economy is to administer 
the public sector in the nation’s interest, taking the private sector’s 
preferences as given. Concerning our framework the government’s problem 
is to choose ???and ? in order to maximize the representative agent’s utility 
given the budget constraint (2).  
In this section we examine the relationship between ?, ? and the level of 
income per capita in a dynamic framework. Equation (23) represents the 
level of income per unit of technology augmented labour in the steady state 
where the growth rate of y, kP, kG1, kG2 is zero. If the economy experiences a 
shock, transitional dynamics designed to reach a new equilibrium will be 
stimulated. Equilibrium will be reached after a transition period 
characterized by positive but declining growth rates. When this process ends 
the economy is in a new the steady state, the capital stock and output has 
reached levels at which the new rate of net investment is only sufficient to 
maintain a constant capital/labour ratio.3 
Log-linearising equations (16)-(18), and given the production function 
(11), we can write the expression for the growth rate of output per unit of 
labour (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2004):  







                                                
 (24) 
where ? represents the convergence rate, depending on parameters from 
production and utility function4 and y* is the steady state output per unit of 
labour determined by equation (23). 
 
3 The presence of three state variables severely limited our ability to formally investigate the transitional 
dynamics of the system, which is likely to be characterized by saddle-point behaviour. Employing models 
with two state variables Futagami et al. (1993); Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Turnovsky (1997), 
analyse the linear approximation around the steady state. However in our model when the economy 
departs far from its steady state, the linear approximations may become both quantitatively and 
qualitatively erroneous. 
4 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for details. 
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Equation (24) shows that the rate of growth of output per unit of labour 
depends, negatively, on the level of y at time t (the convergence effect ?), 
and, positively, on the level of y in the steady state. 
The growth rate during the transition is related to the policy instruments ? 
and ? in the same way in which we described above, where we illustrated the 
influence of policy on the steady state level of output per worker. In detail, 
government can influence the growth rate of y by determining the size of its 
intervention and the relative shares of the two kinds of expenditure, G1 and 
G2, which are committed to the accumulation of public capital KG1 and KG2. 
However, since the relationships between the rate of growth and ? and ? are 
non-monotonic, the influence of the effects of government policy is 
ambiguous, depending upon the current levels of ? and ?. 
Taking logs of (23) and rearranging equation (24), it gives an expression 
for the average growth rate of y between the initial period 0 and time T.  
? ?
? ?
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From equation (25) one can see that the government size ? and the 
allocation parameter ? have two effects on the growth rate. There is a 
positive effect, due to the productive role of public capital )(ln(? and ))ln(? , 
and a negative effect, due to collecting resources from the private sector 
))1(ln( ??  and the (mis)allocation of government expenditures with different 
levels of productivity ))1(ln( ?? . From equation (25) it is straightforward to 
see that as ???goes to, either 0 or 1, then the growth rate goes to -?. This 
implies that a too low or too high level of taxation can lead to negative 
growth rates.  
Taking derivatives with respect to ? and ? separately and setting them to 
zero, we obtain the levels of ? and ? which maximize the growth rate (?opt, 




















For a given ? eq. (26) tells us that the maximizing value of ? is 
determined by the relative magnitudes of private and public capital 
elasticities as an increasing function of the ratio (?1+?2)/? (eq (26)).  
The growth maximising level of government spending occurs when the 
marginal product of public capital equals marginal costs. Any public 
spending beyond this level crowds out private investment and reduces 
growth and the steady state level of output per worker. In other words, up to 
a certain point the distortional effects of tax are more than compensated for 
by the productive effects of public investment. As government grows, the 
detrimental effects of a high level of taxation prevail over productive effects. 
Further increases in ? will make the situation worse. 
When government size is below ?opt the marginal product of public 
capital is above the marginal product of private capital. In this case the 
economy is not making full use of all public capital potentialities and so it 
will reach a relatively low level of steady state income per unit of labour 
after a transition period characterized by a low rate of growth compared to 
the maximum. The opposite occurs for any ?>?opt. Clearly, the shape of this 
relationship depends on both private and public capital elasticities. The 
higher the relative share of the contribution of public capital to overall 
production the higher should be government investment in order to 
maximize growth. The same result is also achieved in Bajo-Rubio (2000) 
employing a neoclassical setting, where however, consumer maximization is 
not considered. 
Successively we analyse the growth effects assuming that the government 
has different kinds of expenditures. From equation (25), given government 
size, the share of different kinds of expenditure in the public budget 
influences the growth rate of the economy during transition to the steady 
state and also the long run level of output per worker (eq. (23)). Again from 
equation (25), as ??goes to either 0 or 1, then the growth rate goes to -?. The 
direction of the composition effect depends on two aspects: 1) relative 
elasticities of different kind of public capital ?1 and ?2, and 2) the actual 
share ? and 1-? of government spending devoted to the accumulation of two 
different kinds of public capital. 
Growth-maximizing values of ? can differ substantially across 
economies. When ?1=?2 the best composition of the public budget assigns 
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equal resources to G1 and G2, occurring when ?=0.5. The relationship 
between ? and the growth rate becomes asymmetrical when ?1??2. In detail, 
when ?1<?2 the maximizing level of ? is less than 0.5, which corresponds to a 
relative higher share of resources attributed to G2. The opposite occurs for 
?1>?2. 







                                                
), an increment in G1, 
that is, major accumulation of KG1, results in a higher rate of growth for each 
economy even when ?????. This is because at low levels KG1 exhibits high 
marginal returns relative to KG2. However beyond a certain limit, determined 
by eq. (27), there are decreasing returns to KG1. This reduces the advantages 
of investing in this kind of capital.  
It is worth noting that eq. (26) and eq. (27) also represent maximising 
values for the steady state level of output per worker (y*) given by eq. (23) 
which in turn strongly depends on fiscal policy. However, and here we come 
to the essential point, given the properties of diminishing returns on public 
capital implicit in the model, any effect of policy on growth tends to 
disappear in the long run. In this state the transitional dynamics leave the 
economy with a growth rate determined by the rate of exogenous 
technological progress.  
This is in fact what makes this work different from similar results 
obtained within endogenous frameworks (Devarajan et al, 1996; Ghosh and 
Gregoriou, 2008)5, where the absence of diminishing returns do not arise 
when government variables grow along with private capital. So in these 
cases and unlike in this paper, endogenous models allow government to 
permanently influence economic growth.  
Improvements decrease as the distance from optimality becomes 
narrower. Given ????the gain in terms of output growth is larger when public 
capital elasticities are different. Once again, it becomes clear that the effect 
of a certain variation in the composition of government spending on growth 
depends on its proportion of the optimal value of ?. The higher the ratio 
????opt the higher the final effect. 
Finally, the speed at which a dynamic system approaches the steady-state 
equilibrium is clearly an important aspect of public intervention. For 
example, should the speed of convergence be rapid, then it would be 
possible to evaluate public policies with respect to their long-run effect on 
growth. Conversely, if the speed were relatively slow, then a consistent part 
 















?? which, for the Cobb-Douglas case (? = 0), turns out to be the expression 
obtained in eq. (27). 
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of the dynamic adjustment would take place far away from the equilibrium. 
This highlights the need to analyse the transitional aspects of public policies 
(Atolia et al 2009). 
 
4.    CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper shows that it is possible to maximise growth during the 
transition path to the steady state by controlling the size of the government 
and, also, the composition of government expenditure within the traditional 
neoclassical framework. 
The model considers two different categories of government spending. It 
allows public capital productivity to differ and assumes that all government 
investment positively affects the productivity of private factors. For a given 
composition of public expenditure the aim is to find the spending level 
which maximise growth, reallocating resources between private and public 
capital according to their relative elasticity which maximise the agent’s 
utility.  
In the same way, for a given level of public spending (which can be 
easily considered fixed in the short-medium term) the aim of the model is to 
find the growth maximizing composition of public spending given private 
agent’s choice. Changes in the spending structure lead to different growth 
rates, depending on their relative elasticity and share. This should induce 
governments to redistribute budgets between less and more productive 
public capital to achieve the optimum balance, thereby yielding stronger 
positive transitional growth effects than would otherwise be obtained. 
The economy in the long term is in the steady state where growth only 
depends on exogenous factors. Fiscal policy has considerable influence on 
the levels of capital and output. Given the properties of diminishing returns 
on public capital, any effect of policy on growth tends to disappear in the 
long run. This differentiates this work from endogenous models where 
diminishing returns do not arise and the government can permanently 
influence economic growth.  
Nevertheless, the transitional period of increased growth resulting from 
an optimal public spending can be rather long. As Barro and Sala?i?Martin 
(2004) suggest, at least five years are necessary to reach half of the 
transition, and if a broad concept of capital is used, this becomes 27 years. 
This highlights the need for short-medium term analysis such as that in this 
work.  
Finally, the model has an important empirical implication which comes 
from the hypothesis of non-monotonicity between public spending and 
growth and from the effects of the composition of government expenditures. 
Research on optimal tax rates should take into account all the effects that 
public capital has on the economy. To be more precise, an increase in public 
 14
capital at the expense of private capital is likely to accelerate or brake the 
economic growth rate. The latter effect typically depends on the marginal 
product of public and private capital respectively. Studies on fiscal policy 
which postulate a monotonic relationship (either positive or negative) and 
merely add an ad hoc government variable may well suffer from mis-
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